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ENJOINING PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT:
DISCARDING THE DEFAMATION ANALOGY
English courts expanded the tort of slander of title,1 creating the tort
of product disparagement, to protect a merchant's interest in the reputa-
tion of his goods and services.2 American courts have drawn upon com-
mercial tort law and the law of defamation to develop further the tort of
product disparagement.' The substantive and remedial aspects of com-
mercial tort law and defamation, however, differ significantly. Tradi-
tional remedies for commercial torts typically include both monetary and
injunctive relief,4 whereas the sole remedy for successful defamation ac-
tions, as a matter of well-established equitable principles and constitu-
tional law, is monetary damages.5 The conjoining of these two bodies of
law by American courts has impeded the development of a coherent sys-
tem of relief for successful disparagement claims.6 In particular, the in-
jection of the elements of defamation into product disparagement has
1. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 503 (1973). Professor Dobbs cites
Dickes v. Fenne, 1 March 93, 1 Rolle Abr. 58, W. Jones 444 (K.B. 1639), as an example of a slander
of title or commercial disparagement. In Dickes, the defendant made the following remarks to the
plaintiff's customers about the quality of his beer: "[H]he would give a peck of malt to his mare, and
she should pisse as good beare as [plaintiff] doth Brew." Id.
2. See, eg., General Prods. Co. v. Meredith Corp., 526 F. Supp. 546, 553 (E.D. Va. 1981)
(product disparagement is designed to protect "the owner's interest in the vendibility of his
products").
3. See, ag., Advanced Training Sys. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1984) (relax-
ation of modem commercial tort law justifies relaxation of causation requirements in product dispar-
agement actions). Other courts have wrestled with the role of defamation's constitutional
restrictions in disparagement actions. See Systems Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp.,
555 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1977); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 191 N.J. Super. 202, 465
A.2d 953 (1983), af#'d, 198 N.J. Super. 19, 486 A.2d 344 (1985); see also infra notes 23-32.
4. See, eg.,, International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (court upholds
injunction directed at defendant's misappropriation of plaintiff's news gathering efforts); Burger
King of Fla., Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968) (court approves injunction preventing
defendant from using Burger King trademark outside a limited geographical area); see also DOBBS,
supra note 1, at 503 (discussing damages in disparagement actions).
5. See, ag., Leo Winter v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 497 F. Supp. 429 (D.D.C.
1980) (action for defamation dismissed because plaintiff sought injunctive relief); see also Kuhn v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (defendant's defamatory movie not
enjoinable because plaintiff may collect monetary damages).
6. In System Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1977),
the court suggested that injunctive relief in disparagement actions may be unconstitutional. See also
Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 191 N.J. Super. 202, 465 A.2d 953 (1983), aff'd, 198
N.J. Super. 19, 486 A.2d 344 (1985) (constitutionality of disparagement injunctions unsettled).
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unnecessarily deprived injured merchants of injunctive relief when per-
sons subject their products to false attacks.
This Note focuses on the confusion caused when courts erroneously
equate defamation with disparagement. Part I of this Note demonstrates
that courts should treat product disparagement as a commercial tort,
therefore entitling disparagement victims to injunctive relief similar to
victims of other commercial torts. Part II discusses potential constitu-
tional and equitable barriers to injunctive relief in disparagement actions,
concluding that courts have improperly denied injunctive relief in these
actions. Finally, part III proposes a theory of relief for victims of dispar-
agement, incorporating the availability of injunctive relief. In the past,
courts have blurred the substantive aspects of disparagement and defa-
mation, refusing to provide the same remedies for disparagement as they
provide for other commercial torts.7
I. DISPARAGEMENT VERSUS DEFAMATION
Product disparagement and defamation are fundamentally different
torts. Product disparagement is an attack calculated to harm the reputa-
tion of a merchant's product. Defamation, on the other hand, is the pro-
mulgation of falsehoods harmful to a person's own reputation.
A. Proving Product Disparagement and Defamation
To prevail with a product disparagement claim, the plaintiff must typi-
cally prove: (1) that defendant made a disparaging statement-that is,
the defendant impugned the quality of the plaintiff's goods or services;'
(2) the disparaging statement was false;9 (3) the defendant made the dis-
paraging statement with common-law malice; 0 and (4) the existence of,
7. See Note, Corporate Defamation and Product Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy to
Personal Defamation, 75 COLuM. L. REV. 963 (1975) (courts have not yet settled the distinction
between defamation and disparagement).
8. See, eg., Wendy's of South Jersey, Inc. v. Blanchard Management Corp., 406 A.2d 1337,
1338 (1979) ("[Ihe tort of product disparagment... involves aspersing the quality of one's prop-
erty ... "); Graf, Disparaging the Product-Are the Remedies Reliable?, 9 DuQ. L. REV. 163, 166
(1970).
9. See, eg., Bunch v. Artee Int'l Corp., 559 F. Supp. 961, 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[F]alsity is a
necessary element of a [disparagement] claim .... ). Other countries prohibit truthful disparage-
ment. See Wolff, Unfair Competition by Truthful Disparagement, 47 YALE L.J. 1304 (1938).
10. See Note, Disparagement Under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 51 IoWA L.
REv. 1066, 1068-69 (collecting cases that discuss malice); see also infra note 17 and accompanying
text.
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and possibly the precise extent of, a pecuniary injury." The first two
elements of a cause of action for product disparagement establish com-
mercially improper conduct.
Defamation actions provide recovery for persons, including corpora-
tions, who suffer injuries to personal reputation. 12  The plaintiff must
prove the defendant made a defamatory statement. The plaintiff does not
have to prove the defamatory statement's falsity; rather, truth is an af-
firmative defense to a claim of defamation.13 Furthermore, unlike in a
disparagement action, the plaintiff usually need not demonstrate a spe-
cific pecuniary loss caused by the defamatory statement. Courts will
often presume injury from the nature of the statement. 14
The first amendment imposes significant limitations on defamation ac-
tions. Although defamation was historically without the protection of
the freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has increasingly recognized
limitations on the suppression of even defamatory speech. In the
landmark defamation case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 5 the
Supreme Court held that "public figures" who sue for defamation must
demonstrate "actual malice" on the part of the defendant. 6 The plaintiff
satisfies the actual malice requirement upon proof that the defendant
made the defamatory statement with actual knowledge or reckless disre-
11. See, eg., Sbrocco v. Pacific Fruit. Inc., 566 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (claim that busi-
ness reputations has been damaged and will be further damaged in future years is insufficient); Sys-
tems Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1143 (3d Cir. 1977) (injunction
against disparaging statements improper because plaintiff has no reasonable probability of demon-
strating special damages). But see Ellis v. Waldrop, 627 S.W.2d 791, 797 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982)
(holding that proof of loss of a specific sale as a requisite to damages for slander of title is no longer
required).
12. See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and
Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1353-54 (1974) (discussing the law of libel and
slander). For a recent survey of the treatment of defamation in state courts, see generally LIBEL
DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER 509-STATE SURVEY 1983 (H. Kaufman ed. 1983).
13. See, eg., United Wild Rice, Inc. v. Nelson, 313 N.W.2d 628, 634 (Minn. 1982) (court
presumes the falsity of an alleged defamatory statement); Eaton, supra note 12, at 1353 n.16.
14. In several cases, injury is presumed and the defamation is actionable per se when the state-
ment imputes a crime, a loathsome disease, unchastity of a woman, or affect the plaintiff's trade or
business. See, e-g., Hunt v. Gerlemann, 581 S.W.2d 913 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
16. Id. at 274. The Supreme Court has established three categories of "public figures:" (1) a
limited number of persons such as politicians or celebrities, who have voluntarily achieved "general
fame or notoriety in the community;" (2) a person who thrusts himself into the public eye-for
example, an abortion protester-in a particular situation voluntarily becomes a public figure; and
(3) in rare cases, a person might involuntarily become a public figure, for example, someone who
wins a lottery. See Eaton, supra note 12, at 1421-22.
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gard of the statement's falsity.17 In Gertz v. Welch, 18 the Court held that
in defamation actions brought by "private figures," courts cannot impose
liability consistent with the first amendment absent proof of at least
negligence.19
The remedies for defamation actions are also subject to constitutional
limitations. Thus, a court may not enjoin defamatory statements.20 An
injunction against the promulgation of a defamatory statement represents
a prior restraint of speech. Except in narrowly defined areas, prior re-
straints of speech are presumptively deemed unconstitutional. 2' Accord-
ingly, a person threatened by injury from a defamatory statement must
wait until the defendant publishes the defamatory statement before seek-
ing relief.22 Injunctive relief is unavailable.
The constitutional limitations necessarily imposed on defamation ac-
tions underscore the importance of distinguishing between disparage-
ment and defamation actions.
B. The Strained Alliance Between Disparagement and Defamation
Courts often fail to distinguish between defamation and disparage-
ment, probably because both torts remedy false statements that produce
reputational injuries. Moreover, factual situations that raise issues of dis-
paragement can also raise issues of defamation. 23 Courts that treat dis-
17. 376 U.S. at 274. Common-law malice, see supra note 10 and accompanying text, on the
other hand, refers to a sense of ill-will, hatred, or statements calculated to injure. Williams v. Trust
Co. of Ga., 140 Ga. App. 49, 54, 230 S.E.2d 45, 50 (1976).
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 fn.30 (1984), the
Supreme Court stated that: "The burden of proving 'actual malice' requires the plaintiff to demon-
strate with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant realized that his statement was false or
that he subjectively entertained serious doubt as to the truth of his statement."
18. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
19. Id. at 347. A "private figure" includes any plaintiff who cannot be classified as a "public
figure;" see supra note 16. The state courts are of course free to interpret their own constitutions to
require an "actual malice" requirement in "private figure" defamation actions. See Seegmiller v.
KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 973 (Utah 1981) (the states "have divided over the appropriate standard to
be adopted").
20. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (striking down a statute that allowed injunc-
tions against defamatory statements); Kessler v. General Servs. Admin., 341 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1964)
("courts generally will not enjoin torts against the person"); Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80, 103
(C.D. Cal. 1980) (prior restraint of noncommercial speech is presumptively unconstitutional).
21. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
22. See, eg., Kuhn v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 800 (N.Y. 1939) (defamed plain-
tiff has adequate remedies at law).
23. See, eg., National Ref. Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 20 F.2d 763, 773 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 570 (1927) (Lewis, J., dissenting) (statement that a maltster used filthy and disgust-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss1/7
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paragement and defamation as inseparable are likely to define
disparagement by reference to defamation law.
The alliance between defamation and disparagement has led some
courts to impose an "actual malice" element of proof on "public figures"
who bring product disparagement claims.24 In Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Senti-
nel Publishing Co.,25 for example, a newspaper published a derogatory
article based on the test results of the plaintiff's new product. The court
emphasized that the claim was based on the publication of allegedly inac-
curate test results and therefore was properly characterized as an action
based upon a false statement.26 The court refused to decide for purposes
of the case whether the action was for defamation or disparagement,
holding that in either case the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
acted with "actual malice. "27
C. Disparagement's Relationship to Commercial Torts
Product disparagement is better characterized as a commercial tort
than a hybrid of defamation law. The substantive and policy-based simi-
larities between disparagement and other commercial torts contrast with
the superficial factual similarities between disparagement and defama-
tion. Commercial torts and disparagement, unlike defamation, require
the plaintiff to prove a commercially improper act.28 Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act,29 for example, provides a federal remedy for someone in-
jured by a merchant's misrepresentations of the quality or performance
ing water for the malting of grains is actionable for defamation); Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (magazine's criticism of electric car
not only disparaged the car, but also defamed the car's producer); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
of United States, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1259 (Mass. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 189
(1st Cir. 1982), af#'d, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (disparaging comments invariably reflect on a corpora-
tion's reputation); Crinkley v. Dow Jones & Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 869, 877, 24 Ill. Dec. 573, -, 385
N.E.2d 714, 720 (1978) (a statement may simultaneously attack both the quality and integrity of a
product, in which case both causes of action [ie., disparagement and defamation] may lie). See also
Note, Corporate Defamation and Product Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy to Personal Defa-
mation, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 963, 971 (1975) (a strongly disparaging statement is almost invariably
actionable for defamation as well.)
24. See Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 191 N.J. Super. 202, 465 A.2d 953
(1983), aff'd, 198 N.J. Super. 19, 486 A.2d 344 (1985).
25. 191 N.J. Super. 202, 465 A.2d 953 (1983), aff'd, 198 N.J. Super. 19, 486 A.2d 344 (1985).
26. Id. at 216, 465 A.2d at 960.
27. Id. at 210 n.2, 465 A.2d at 957.
28. See supra notes 8-22 and accompanying text.
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982).
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of his goods.30 Like a disparagement claim, a successful section 43(a)
claim requires proof of both a false statement and a subsequent injury.
A significant difference between disparagement and other commercial
torts is remedial. Injunctive relief is freely available to successful com-
mercial tort claimants;31 however, disparagement victims must often set-
tle for compensatory relief.32  Many courts have deprived product
disparagement victims of injunctive relief, again because of the strained
alliance between disparagement and defamation.
II. THE BARRIERS TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Courts and commentators have pointed out that disparagement threat-
ens a commercial property interest and therefore should be enjoinable.33
In Black & Yates v. Mahogany Association, Inc.,3 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit enjoined the distribution of a cir-
cular that disparged the quality of the plaintiff's mahogany. The court
found that the disparagment was unfair competition, a proper subject for
injunctive relief.35 A majority of courts, however, still refuse to enjoin
disparaging statements. 36 These courts reason that enjoining product
disparagement violates the first amendment and that the traditional pow-
ers of equity restrict the availability of injunctive relief. Neither of these
rationales justify the denial of injunctive relief in product disparagement
cases.
30. Section 43(a) reads: Any person who shall.., use in connection with goods or services, or
any container or containers for goods, a false designation or origin, or any false description or repre-
sentation... shall be liable to a civil action by any person... likely to be damaged by the use of any
such false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1982).
Although the Lanham Act is a trademark act, misrepresentations about one's own product are
actionable under § 43(a). See Exquisite Form Indus., Inc. v. Exquisite Fabrics of London, 378 F.
Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (any misrepresentation regarding the product is actionable under § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act).
31. See, eg., Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Houston Ice & Brewing Co., 250 U.S. 28 (1918);
Molex, Inc. v. Nolen, 759 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1985).
32. See, eg., Greenberg v. DeSalvo, 254 La. 1019, 229 So. 2d 83 (1969), cert. denied sub. nom.
Greenberg v. Dunker, 397 U.S. 1075 (1970).
33. See, eg., Black & Yates v. Mahogany Ass'n, 129 F.2d 227, 235 (3dCir. 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 672 (1942) (expressly stating that disparagement is enjoinable); Innovative Concepts in
Entertainment, Inc. v. Entertainment Enters. Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 457, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (en-
joining defendant from circulating an allegedly disparaging "comparison" between two games).
34. 129 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 672 (1942).
35. Id. at 235.
36. See Fashion Two Twenty, Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836, 849 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (col-
lecting cases).
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A. The Constitutional Barrier to Injunctive Relief
The potential constitutional barriers to injunctive relief for disparage-
ment fall into two categories. First, a defendant will likely assert that the
first amendment's freedom of speech clause forbids injunctions in dispar-
agement actions.3 7 Second, the common factual nucleus that supports
both a disparagement claim and a defamation claim arguably compels
the application of defamation's remedial restrictions to disparagement
actions.38
An injunction against a disparaging statement constitutes a prior re-
straint of speech.39 Except in limited circumstances, prior restraints are
presumptively unconstitutional.' The doctrine of prior restraints, how-
ever, does not apply to commercial speech.4 Commercial speech is
speech that merely proposes a commercial transaction or, alternatively,
speech related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and audi-
ence.42 Although commercial speech is entitled to protection under the
first amendment, the Supreme Court has recognized that commercial
speech, being less valuable in relation to the core values of the first
amendment, is entitled to considerably less protection than other kinds of
speech.43 If disparaging speech constitutes commercial speech in a par-
ticular case, then an injunction against such speech is not an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint.
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,' the Court struck down a state prohibition on the publica-
tion of price terms in prescription drug advertisements. The Court, how-
ever, expressly recognized state power to regulate "deceptive or
37. See Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 191 N.J. Super. 202, 210 n.2, 465 A.2d
953, 957 (1983), afl'd, 198 N.J. Super. 19, 486 A.2d 344 (1985).
38. See Greenberg v. DeSalvo, 254 La. 1019, 229 So.2d 83 (1969), cert denied sub nom. Green-
berg v. Dunker, 397 U.S. 1075 (1970).
39. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
40. See, eg., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1968) ("Any system of prior re-
straints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity.").
41. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 n.24 (1976). The Court explained that "the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial
speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the
speaker." Id.
42. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
43. Id.
44. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Number 2]
Washington University Open Scholarship
212 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 64:205
misleading" commercial speech.45 Thus, deceptive commercial speech is
outside the protection of the first amendment.4 Courts already enjoin
other forms of deceptive commercial speech.47 Once a court decides that
one form of misleading or untruthful commercial speech is constitution-
ally enjoinable, then other forms, such as disparaging statements, should
also be enjoinable.48
Although injunctions against disparagement are not per se unconstitu-
tional, the factual similarity between disparagement and defamation
claims49 creates a potential barrier to injunctive relief. An injunction
against a defamatory statement is an unconstitutional prior restraint of
speech. If a statement simultaneously disparages a person's goods and
defames his reputation, an injunction restraining the disparagement ar-
guably restrains the defamation as well.5 0 However, statements that pri-
marily disparage should not receive constitutional protection. The
Supreme Court has never converted unprotected speech into protected
speech simply because the unprotected speech contains minor elements
of protected speech." Conversely, primarily defamatory statements are
not enjoinable even though the speech contains elements of product dis-
paragement. 2 The Court protects certain defamatory speech to ensure
45. Id. at 771 n.24.
46. In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980),
the Supreme Court explained that for commercial speech to come within the first amendment, it
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
47. In Alder, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978),
for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld an injunction prohibiting the defendant from
soliciting clients from the plaintiff law firm that had previously employed the defendant. The court
held that the speech enjoined was not protected by the first amendment because it improperly inter-
fered with existing contractual relationships. Id. at 423-28, 393 A.2d at 1179-81.
48. For example, a person who makes a false statement about his own goods and injures a
competitor violates § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See supra note 30. Furthermore, the injured com-
petitor may seek injunctive relief in federal court. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 583
F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). No principled distinction exists between deceptive statements made about
one's own goods and disparaging statements made about another's goods.
49. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
50. See, eg., Greenberg v. DeSalvo, 254 La. 1019, 229 So.2d 83 (1969), cert. denied sub nom.
Greenberg v. Dunker, 397 U.S. 1075 (1970). In Greenburg, the court overturned an injunction for-
bidding the defendant from referring to the plaintiff, who was an attorney, as a crook and a "slimy
kike." Id. at 254 La. at 1031, 229 So.2d at 88. The court held that the statements could not be
enjoined because "the personality of the plaintiff and his standing as a lawyer cannot be separated on
a rational basis." Id.
51. See, eg., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
52. The Constitution prohibits courts from enjoining defamatory speech. Near v. Minnesota,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss1/7
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the flow of truthful speech. 3 Untruthful speech should not receive con-
stitutional protection simply because it has defamatory elements. Courts
should be free to enjoin speech with elements of disparagement and defa-
mation if the injunction will not impede the flow of truthful speech.5 4
B. The Equitable Barrier to Injunctive Relief
Courts have also erected an equitable barrier to the availability of in-
junctive relief in disparagement actions. Equity traditionally has been
reluctant to intervene in cases involving defamation or disparagement. 5
In Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott,56 a nineteenth-century English
court held that "a false and injurious statement respecting the plaintiff's
business" could not be enjoined. The court did not distinguish between
statements causing pecuniary injury and those causing an injury to per-
283 U.S. 697 (1931); Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80, 103 (C.D. Cal. 1980); see supra notes 20-22
& 39 and accompanying text.
Courts face difficult and unresolved issues, however, when the false speech is substantially both
disparaging and defamatory. For example, in Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 224 F. Supp. 978 (D.
Or. 1963), appeal dismissed, 336 F.2d 876, affid, 337 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1964), the plaintiff erected a
sign on his property near a highway reading, "THIS RANCH IS CONTAMINATED... FLOU-
RIDE POISON FROM REYNOLDS METAL CO. KILLS OUR CAT'TLE." Id. at 979. The
defendant counterclaimed for both disparagement and defamation. Id. The court held that the sign
was defamatory; however, the disparagement claim failed because special damages were not proven.
Id. at 980. If the court had found that the sign also disparaged Reynolds Metals' products, an
injunction against the disparaging language would also have effectively enjoined defamatory lan-
guage. The sign was not divisible into disparaging and defamatory elements. The court could only
order taking down the whole sign. No amount of judicial creativity could have fashioned an injunc-
tion removing just the disparaging material.
53. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973);
see also Advanced Training Sys. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984) (defendant's
published criticism of plaintiff's product may be constitutionally enjoined because "defendants have
circulated their material for a number of years, and the court and jury have had the opportunity to
gauge its actual impact").
54. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (proposing a test for determining whether
disparaging speech is enjoinable).
55. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Employees, 400 Ill.
38, 41-42 (1948) (injunction directed at union's disparagement of department store vacated because
"[t]he jurisdiction of a court of chancery does not extend to cases of libel (sic) ... as to the character
of quality of the plaintiff's property"); Murphy v. Daytona Beach Humane Soc'y, Inc. 176 So.2d 922
(Fla. App. 1965) (claim that defendant "is attempting to hamper the operations of [plaintiff] ... by
certain correspondence and publications which falsely attack the management and officers [and]
cause irreparable harm" states no ground upon which equitable relief can be granted). See also C.
TIEDMAN, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 487 (1883); J. WILLARD, TREATISE ON EQ-
urrY JURISPRUDENCE 401 (1963) (courts will "not restrain a rival from publishing an advertisement
tending to disparage another's work").
56. [1874] L.R. 10 Ch. App. 142, 144.
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sonal reputation.57 Prudential extended equity's traditional reluctance to
enjoin defamation to disparagement cases because the court viewed these
two torts as indistinguishable. Prudential was overruled, however, by an
English statute that granted courts the power to enjoin disparaging
statements.
58
American courts also reject the premise underlying Prudential and de-
fine disparagement and defamation in fundamentally different manners,
but often do not rely upon the distinction for the relief they grant.59
Thus, American courts have effectively adhered to the Prudential doc-
trine by denying injunctive relief in disparagement actions.60 Courts that
refuse to enjoin disparagement are not furthering justice or equitable
principles. Although substantial caselaw supports a flat prohibition on
disparagement injunctions, the caselaw is an outgrowth of a discredited,
overruled nineteenth-century English case.
A successful disparagement plaintiff has identified an injured property
interest by demonstrating a specific pecuniary loss. The equitable barrier
against disparagement injunctions leaves unprotected a merchant's inter-
ests in his goods and services, and is therefore inconsistent with one of
the purposes of equity.61
57. Disparaging statements injure property, while defamatory statements injure reputation. See
supra notes 8-22 and accompanying text.
58. See E. MERWIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING 469 (1895).
59. See, eg., Murphy v. Daytona Beach Humane Soc'y Inc., 176 So.2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1965) ("It
seems to be well settled that a court of equity will never lend its aid, by injunction, to restrain the
libeling or slandering of title to property .... ); Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shield, 171 N.Y. 382, 64
N.E. 163 (1902); C. TIEDMAN, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 487 (1883) ("While the
English have recently allowed injunctions... to restrain libelous publications against one's business,
trade, or title to land... American courts have not manifested any disposition to follow the example
of the English Courts. ").
60. See, eg., Robert E. Hicks Corp. v. National Salesmen's Training Ass'n, 19 F.2d 963, 964
(7th Cir. 1927); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 224 F. Supp. 978, 984 (D. Or. 1963), appeal dis-
missed, 336 F.2d 876, aft'd, 337 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1964).
61. Courts have tried to deal with the harshness of the equitable barrier to disparagement in-
junctions by developing a broad exception to the flat prohibition against such injunctions. Thus,
some courts hold that disparagement can be enjoined if the disparagement was accompanied by
other, independently enjoinable, tortious acts. See, eg., Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 35 F.2d
403, 407-08 (7th Cir. 1929), cerL denied, 281 U.S. 737 (1930) (enjoining defendant's propaganda
campaign designed to intimidate customers and dealers interested in purchasing plaintiff's product);
Lion Oil Co. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 252 Ill. App. 92, 98 (1929) (enjoining defendant's campaign of
disparaging statements because defendant made no effort to stop the slanderous statements).
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ENJOINING PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT
III. A THEORY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR PRODUCT
DISPARAGEMENT CLAIMS
Injunctive relief in disparagement actions can provide an appropriate
remedy for disparagement victims and also protect the defendant's first
amendment rights. First, courts should freely enjoin purely or primarily
disparaging speech.62 Second, courts should enjoin speech that is both
disparaging and defamatory if the defendant acted with "actual mal-
ice."63 An actual malice requirement would accommodate both the de-
fendant's first amendment rights and the plaintiff's interests in his goods
and services. Moreover, any defamatory speech incidentally affected by
the injunction against the disparagement is already accorded less first
amendment protection because the defendant had actual malice.'
The use of an actual malice test to determine the propriety of dispar-
agement injunctions would be constitutional and effective. Although all
plaintiffs will not be able to demonstrate actual malice, those defendants
who repeatedly disparage the plaintiff's goods or services will be en-
joined. A defendant who knowingly or recklessly makes false statements
is less likely to be deterred by the threat of monetary damages than other
defendants. As a result, an injunction becomes the only adequate and
effective form of relief.
Those speakers who aggressively criticize other products will not be
enjoined if they believe that their statements are truthful. The flow of
truthful commercial speech, with its attendant benefits, will therefore not
be inhibited. Additionally, courts will be using a test that already has
had wide application. The use of the actual malice test will not in itself
produce additional litigation.
62. The plaintiff's reputation is only affected slightly by purely or primarily disparaging speech.
See supra notes 39-54 and accompanying text (discussing defamation law).
63. See text accompanying supra note 27 (defining "actual malice"). If a person expects an
injunction only when he knows his statements are false, then the threat of an injunction will not
deter those who believe they are speaking truthfully.
64. The Supreme Court allows a "public figure" defamation plaintiff to prevail only when the
defendant has actual malice. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Thus, the
Court has established a constitutional distinction between the protection afforded defamatory speech
made with and without actual malice. A merchant who had critical comments about his competi-
tors' products would have his comments suppressed only if the comments were false and the
merchant knew or should have known the critical comments were false. His truthful comments
would not be enjoined and his false comments would not be enjoined if the merchant does not believe
they are false. Therefore, injunctive relief in disparagement claims in unlikely to suppress truthful
speech.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Injunctive relief in product disparagement actions faces much resist-
ance based on ancient and discredited precedent. Many courts have held
that disparagement injunctions are unconstitutional or outside the
courts' equitable jurisdiction. The availability of injunctive relief in
product disparagement actions, however, recognizes the close alliance be-
tween product disparagement and other commercial torts. The tort of
product disparagement protects the plaintiff's interest in the value of his
goods and services. As with any other commercial tort, courts should
enhance that protection by enjoining disparaging statements.
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